

**ACTION:** Extension of time to file comments and oppositions.

**SUMMARY:** The Commission grants one week extension, until January 29, 1979 for parties to file pleadings addressed to amended gateway applications filed in the International Record Carrier's Scope of Operations in Docket No. 19660; RM-690. The extension is granted because of the voluminous nature of the pleadings filed in this proceeding.

**DATES:** Time to file oppositions and reply comments directed towards petitions to deny and comments extended to January 29, 1979.

**ADDRESS:** Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 20554.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Helene Bauman, Common Carrier Bureau, 202-632-7834

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

Adopted: January 19, 1979.  
Released: January 24, 1979.

The Commission has before it a letter filed January 12, 1979 by RCA Global Communications, Inc. requesting an extension of time to file oppositions to the petitions to deny and other comments addressed to its amended gateway expansion applications of RCA Globcom. The letter asks that the time for filing oppositions be extended from January 22, 1979 to February 5, 1979 for the reasons that (1) review of the pleadings addressed to the applications is burdensome, and, (2) the officer responsible for RCA Globcom gateway expansion program is unavailable until the week the pleadings are now due. In addition we are considering here the comments addressed to the letter that Western Union Telegraph Company has filed.

Review of the reasons underlying the request does not convince us that RCA Globcom warrants a two week extension of time. As RCA recognizes this proceeding has had a long pendancy following the Commission's release of its Tentative Decision in favor of expanding the gateways. See *International Record Carriers' Communications*, 54 FCC 2d 532 (1975). During the more than three year period since that decision and more particularly since the Commission's *Notice of Inquiry and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, released July 28, 1978, RCA Globcom has had more than ample time to analyze its gateway requirements and to anticipate the nature of any opposition which might arise to that expansion. However, because of the voluminous nature of the pleadings an additional seven days will be authorized for preparation of responses.

Accordingly, it is ordered, That the time for the parties to file oppositions and reply comments directed towards the petitions to deny and comments addressed to the applications of the International record carriers for new gateway cities is extended until January 29, 1979.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.

LARRY F. DARBY,  
Acting Chief,  
Common Carrier Bureau.

[FR Doc. 79-3864 Filed 2-2-79; 8:45 am]

[3510-22-M]

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

[50 CFR Part 652]

MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

Public Hearing

**AGENCY:** National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA.

**ACTION:** Notice of Public Hearings.

**SUMMARY:** The Mid-Atlantic and New England Fishery Management Councils will hold hearings to discuss the Draft Environmental Assessment/Amendment No. 1 for the Fishery Management Plan for the Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries. This amendment would extend to December 31, 1979, certain provisions of the present plan which are now scheduled to end prior to December 31. The provisions affected cover the quarterly quotas on landings and the moratorium on the entry of new vessels into the surf clam fishery. The amendment also provides for processor reporting requirements which the Mid-Atlantic Council has established to comply with amendments revising the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The proposed amendment will assure the continuation of the current plan until the completion and adoption of a revised plan for the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries.

**DATES:** Public hearings will be held February 20, Cape May, N.J.; February 21, Norfolk, Va.; and Tinton Falls, N.J.; February 22, Newport, R.I.; and February 23, Ocean City, Md.

All of the hearings will convene promptly at 7:00 p.m. and adjourn at 10:00 p.m. Hearings will be recorded and the tapes filed as an official transcript of proceedings. Summary minutes will be prepared for each hearing.

Written comments should be submitted by February 28, 1979, to be considered in the amendment process.

**ADDRESSES:** The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council will hold the following public hearings:

February 20—Golden Eagle Motor Inn, Philadelphia Avenue on the Beach, Cape May, New Jersey 08204.

February 21—Quality Inn Lake Wright, 6280 Northampton Boulevard, Box 2048, Norfolk, Virginia 23502.

February 21—Hilton Inn, 700 Hope Road, Tinton Falls, New Jersey 07724.

February 23—Sheraton Fountainebleau Inn, 10100 Ocean Highway, Ocean City, Maryland 21842.

The New England Fishery Management Council will hold the following public hearing:

February 22—Newport Harbor Treadway Inn on the Harbor, Newport, Rhode Island 02840.

**SEND COMMENTS TO:** Mr. John C. Bryson, Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, Room 2115, Federal Building, North and New Streets, Dover, Delaware 19901, Telephone: 320-674-2331.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. John C. Bryson, 320-674-2331.

Dated: January 31, 1979.

WINFRED H. MEIBOHM,  
Associate Director,  
National Marine Fisheries Service.

[FR Doc. 79-3818 Filed 2-2-79; 8:45 am]

[4910-60-M]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Materials Transportation Bureau

[49 CFR Part 195]

[Docket No. PS-56; Notice 1]

TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUIDS BY PIPELINE

Highly Volatile Liquids

**AGENCY:** Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.

**ACTION:** Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

**SUMMARY:** This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites comments on means to reduce the potential for accidents on pipelines used in interstate and foreign commerce to transport highly volatile liquids (HVL). These means are: (1) Make line pipe easier to weld and with tougher longitudinal seams, (2) add water to anhydrous ammonia to inhibit stress corrosion cracking, (3) use lower design and operational stress levels in accordance with population density, and (4) conduct periodic hydrostatic tests. Accident report statistics indicate that pipelines transporting highly volatile liquids have caused a substantially higher percentage of deaths, in-

juries, and property damage than liquid pipelines transporting less volatile commodities. Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) expects that each of the proposed means would reduce the potential for accidents in HVL pipelines.

**DATE:** Comments must be filed by May 4, 1979. Late filed comments will be considered so far as practicable.

**ADDRESS:** Comments should identify the docket and notice numbers and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Branch, Materials Transportation Bureau, 2100 Second Street, SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments are available at Docket Room 6500.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Frank Robinson, (202) 426-0135.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**NEED FOR THIS ADVANCE NOTICE**

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites comments on means to reduce the potential for accidents on pipelines transporting highly volatile liquids. The Federal pipeline safety regulations for transporting hazardous liquids are set forth in Part 195 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These regulations are applicable to pipelines transporting highly volatile liquids.

The definition of a highly volatile liquid which was proposed for adoption under Part 195 of Notice 1 of Docket PS-51 (43 FR 35513, August 10, 1978) was: "A highly volatile liquid (HVL) means a liquid which has an absolute vapor pressure of 100 kPa (14.5 psia) or more at 37.8° C (100° F)." Although the final definition may differ from that proposed, the intent is to identify those liquids with a vapor pressure high enough to form a vapor cloud when released to the atmosphere, such as liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas liquids, and anhydrous ammonia.

Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) accident statistics show that HVL pipelines have caused a substantially higher percentage of deaths, injuries, and property damage than liquid pipelines transporting less volatile commodities. The record of liquid pipeline accidents reported on Form DOT-7000-1 from 1968 through 1976 shows that although HVL accidents comprise only 10 percent of the liquid pipeline accidents, the HVL accidents caused 66 percent of the deaths, 50 percent of the injuries and 30 percent of the property damage.

These statistics clearly illustrate the higher risk posed by an HVL spill than by spills of other liquids. The higher potential for damage is because HVL when released into the atmosphere, forms a gas cloud which is a markedly

different and more insidious hazard than that presented by spills of less volatile liquids. The gas cloud will move downhill or downwind depending on the terrain, type of liquid involved and atmospheric conditions. Because it is generally heavier than air, the gas cloud will tend to hug the ground as it continues to move. If a source of ignition is encountered a petroleum gas cloud will burn or explode. If anhydrous ammonia is spilled, the greatest danger is that of toxicity or asphyxiation. For either commodity, the hazards are severe.

**OTHER CURRENT RULEMAKING TO REDUCE POTENTIAL FOR HVL ACCIDENTS**

MTB recently published the following three notices of proposed rulemaking in an effort to reduce the probability and severity of accidents involving HVL: Docket PS-51, Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, and Emergencies (43 FR 35513, August 10, 1978), Docket PS-53, Valve Spacing on Pipelines Carrying Highly Volatile Liquids (43 FR 39402, September 5, 1978), and Docket PS-55, Testing Highly Volatile Liquid Pipelines (43 FR 52504, November 13, 1978.) Docket PS-51 proposes more stringent requirements for handling emergencies, training operating and maintenance personnel and public education for HVL pipelines. Docket PS-53 proposes automatic or remotely controlled valves at 12 kilometer intervals on new HVL pipelines and equipping most block valves for remote operation on existing HVL pipelines. Docket PS-55 proposes hydrostatic testing HVL lines which have not been previously tested to 1.25 times maximum operating pressure for 24 hours.

**OBJECTIVE**

Because of the high potential for damage to persons and property from even a single HVL accident, MTB is considering further means to reduce the probability of such accidents. MTB is considering these means but needs additional information in order to determine the technical feasibility and economic practicability of each means.

This advance notice is not a proposal to amend the existing regulations. Its only function is to generate information to use in evaluating means for improving HVL pipeline safety. If the evaluation leads to the conclusion that the regulations should be amended, MTB will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking setting forth the proposed amendments and inviting comment on those proposals.

**MEANS BEING CONSIDERED**

MTB is considering several means to reduce the potential for an HVL accident. Some have been recommended to MTB by a Battelle Laboratories

Study, and by an NTSB report. The means being considered are as follows:

**1. PIPE USED FOR HVL PIPELINES**

The Battelle Study "Transportation of Highly Volatile, Toxic, or Corrosive Liquids by Pipeline" (DOT/OPSO-75/06 available for inspection in MTB Docket Room 6500) makes various recommendations to enhance safety on HVL pipelines. Among these is a recommendation that Part 195 impose on carriers more stringent requirements regarding pipe manufacture.

In regulating the type of pipe a carrier may use, part 195 does not delineate how line pipe is to be manufactured. However, it is stated in Sections 195.112 and 195.114 that new and used pipe shall be made of carbon, low alloy-high strength or alloy-type steel suitable for service intended and must be made according to a written specification.

The Battelle study on page 5 recommends two additional requirements related to the manufacture of pipe to be used in HVL service: First, Battelle argues that the weldability of the steel pipe can be improved by limiting the "carbon equivalent" to 0.55 percent. The "carbon equivalent" is defined as the percent by weight of carbon plus one-fourth the percent by weight of manganese. The purpose in improving weldability is to reduce the number of welds that have cracks as a result of the welding process.

Pipe used for HVL pipelines is commonly manufactured to American Petroleum Institute (API) specification 5L or 5LX, which allow a "carbon equivalent" of approximately three times the amount recommended by the Battelle Study.

Secondly, the Battelle Study recommends that the longitudinal weld areas be made tougher by "normalizing" the seam weld areas in pipe which is manufactured by electric resistance welding (ERW). The normalizing treatment consists of heating the weld seam and adjacent material to approximately 1600°F after the pipe has been welded and the weld area has cooled to 1330°F or lower. Normalizing causes transformation of the weld area back to a material more like that of the pipe steel before being welded and results in considerably higher toughness than weld areas that have not been normalized. The purpose of normalizing is to prevent failures in the longitudinal seam weld. Neither Part 195 nor API 5L or 5LX require weld areas to be normalized.

Comments are requested regarding whether limiting the "carbon equivalent" will reduce cracked welds, and whether "normalizing" will reduce weld seam failures. If these manufacturing practices were adopted as regulatory requirements, should they

apply to new pipelines and repairs to existing pipelines? What would be the costs to comply with these requirements? What problems might be encountered in an effort to keep HVL pipe so manufactured segregated from pipe intended for other service?

#### 2. ADD WATER TO ANHYDROUS AMMONIA PIPELINES

In the same study noted above Battelle recommends adding 0.2 percent water by weight to pipelines transporting anhydrous ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>) to inhibit stress corrosion cracking—a type of cracking caused by a combination of stress and electrochemical corrosion.

Although there is no specific requirement in Part 195 to add water to or monitor water content of NH<sub>3</sub> pipelines, Section 195.6 authorizes the Secretary to determine whether and in what manner such commodities may be transported without undue hazard. Under Section 195.6, MTB has required NH<sub>3</sub> pipeline carriers to monitor water content and add water where necessary to obtain 0.2 percent water content by weight.

MTB solicits comments regarding whether stress-corrosion cracking is a problem in NH<sub>3</sub> pipelines? What operational or maintenance problems might be caused by adding 0.2 percent water? What alternative means exist to inhibit stress corrosion cracking? How often should water content or other inhibitor level be monitored?

#### 3. DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL STRESS LEVELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH POPULATION DENSITY

Under Federal gas pipelines safety standards (49 CFR Part 192), pipelines are classified according to their location near populated areas. Such class locations enable standards to be prescribed so that they become more stringent with increased population density.

Unlike Part 192, Part 195 does not provide more stringent standards for pipelines according to population density. Because an HVL vapor cloud may pose a greater hazard to persons and property than a gas leak, should HVL pipelines be designed, constructed, op-

erated, and maintained to similar or more stringent standards than gas transmission pipelines? If so, should existing standards for HVL pipelines be amended to become more stringent according to class locations?

Commenters who believe that standards of increasing stringency are justified should recognize that a vapor cloud can travel a mile or more before being ignited. Given this circumstance, what should be the size of the class location unit? What population densities should define the class locations? Should the design factor change according to class location similar to that in § 192.111? Should the depth of cover vary with class location similar to § 192.327? Sections 192.609, 192.611, and 192.613 prescribe remedial actions when class locations change due to encroaching population. Should similar requirements be prescribed if class locations are adopted for HVL pipelines?

Section 192.619 prescribes factors by which the test pressure must be reduced to obtain the maximum operating pressure. Should maximum operating pressure for HVL pipelines be determined in a like manner? If so, what should be the factors for the various class locations? Section 192.705 prescribes the intervals for patrolling pipelines in accordance with class similar patrol intervals be prescribed for pipelines transporting HVL? Would an accident prevention program encompassing a one-call system negate the need for patrolling more often than two weeks as now required by Part 195?

Assuming a classification scheme similar to that of Part 192, what would be the initial cost of determining class locations along an HVL line?

#### 4. PERIODIC HYDROSTATIC TESTING

Section 195.302 requires that each new pipeline system and each part of a pipeline system that has been relocated or replaced must be hydrostatically tested before it is placed in service. This requirement provides for an initial test of pipeline integrity. There is no current requirement in Part 195 for periodic hydrostatic testing to reconfirm pipeline integrity after a pipeline is placed in service.

The National Transportation Safety Board has suggested periodic hydrostatic testing (Report Number: NTSB-PAR-73-2) as a means to enhance pipeline safety. Although the NTSB report concerns pipeline defects due to corrosion, periodic hydrostatic testing can locate and remove all defects above a certain size existing at the time of the test, that would later cause accidents.

Although periodic hydrostatic testing seems to be an obvious means of removing pipeline defects before those defects cause accidents there are several disadvantages. Among these are: (1) The pipelines being tested must be taken out of service, (2) testing costs can be substantial, and (3) the results of hydrostatic tests cannot be utilized for preventive maintenance because no information is gained concerning gradual deterioration that might be taking place but has not yet reached the point of failure during hydrostatic testing.

MTB solicits comments regarding periodic hydrostatic testing as a means to prevent accidents on HVL pipelines. Is there a need to periodically revalidate the integrity of a pipeline? Is so, is hydrostatic testing a feasible means of revalidation? What should the testing intervals be? What initial construction costs would be incurred to prepare pipelines for periodic testing? What costs would be incurred by loss of throughput when lines are taken out of service for testing? Are there feasible alternative means, such as electronic pigs, to revalidate pipeline integrity? Would these alternative cost less than periodic hydrostatic testing? Would these alternatives provide information on which preventative maintenance programs could be based?

(Sec. 6, Pub. L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 437 (49 U.S.C. 1655, 18 U.S.C. 831-635); 49 CFR 1.53 App A of Part 1 and App A of Part 106)

Issued in Washington, D.C., on February 1, 1979.

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Safety Regulation, Materials  
Transportation Bureau.

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