

Under Executive Order 12044, EPA is required to judge whether a regulation is "significant" and therefore subject to the procedural requirements of the Order or whether it may follow other specialized development procedures. EPA labels these regulations "specialized." This proposed rule has been reviewed, and it has been determined that it is a specialized regulation not subject to the procedural requirements of Executive Order 12044.

\*Versar, Inc., *PCB Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Bans Regulation: Economic Impact Analysis*, EPA 230-03/79-001, Springfield, Virginia, March 1979.

Statutory Authority: Section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2605. The preamble to the Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibition Rule at 44 FR 31514 delegates authority to amend or modify this rule to the Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances.

Dated November 22, 1979.  
Steven D. Jellinek,  
*Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances.*

It is proposed to amend 40 CFR 761.31 by revising the first sentence of paragraph (e)(1) and paragraph (e)(3) and by adding a new paragraph (e)(7) to read as follows:

§ 761.31 Authorizations.

\* \* \* \* \*  
(e) Use in Hydraulic Systems.  
\* \* \* \* \*

(1) Each person who owns a hydraulic system engaged in the production or forming of metal must test for the concentration of PCBs in the hydraulic fluid of each system by November 1, 1979, and at least annually thereafter. \*

\* \* \* \* \*  
(3) Addition of PCBs to any hydraulic system is prohibited;  
\* \* \* \* \*

(7) Persons who own hydraulic systems other than those systems engaged in the production or forming of metal must assume that all their other hydraulic systems contain greater than 50 ppm PCB or test the other hydraulic systems (including such items as forklifts, elevators, and levelers) by [45 days after final rule becomes effective] if the hydraulic systems (A) could have been filled or topped off with PCB hydraulic fluid and (B) are being used at facilities which have or had PCB hydraulic systems engaged in the production or forming of metal. All systems that are tested under subparagraph (7) that have 50 ppm or

greater PCB are subject to the requirements of 761.31(e)(2).  
[FR Doc. 79-36710 Filed 11-28-79; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 6560-01-M

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

41 CFR Parts 8-7, 8-18

Construction Contracts

AGENCY: Veterans Administration.  
ACTION: Proposed Regulatory Development.

SUMMARY: The Veterans Administration is proposing to amend its procurement regulations by revising two provisions relating to construction contracts. The first concerns the release of claims portions of the Payments clauses which are proposed to be revoked as being redundant to the Federal Procurement Regulations. The second concerns the policy on progress payments which is proposed to be changed to remove the mandate against retainage of a percentage of progress payments. That change restores the option of retainage or full payment to the contracting officer and conforms Veterans Administration practice to that of other Federal agencies.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before December 31, 1979. It is proposed to make this change effective 30 days after date of final approval.

ADDRESSES: Send written comments to: Administrator of Veterans Affairs (271A), Veterans Administration, 810 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20420. Comments will be available for inspection at the address shown above during normal business hours until January 8, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. G. Vetter (202-389-2334).

Additional Comment Information

Interested persons are invited to submit written comments, suggestions or objections regarding these documents to the Administrator of Veterans Affairs (271A), Veterans Administration, 810 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20420. All written comments received will be available for public inspection at the above address only between the hours of 8 am and 4:30 pm Monday through Friday (except holidays) until January 8, 1980. Any person visiting Central Office for the purpose of inspecting any such comments will be received by the Central Office Veterans Services Unit in room 132. Such visitors to any VA field station will be informed that the records are available for inspection only in

Central Office and furnished the above address and room number.

Approved: November 21, 1979.  
By direction of the Administrator.  
John J. Leffler,  
*Associate Deputy Administrator.*

1. In § 8-7.650-14, paragraphs (f) of the clauses in paragraphs (a) and (b) are revoked.

§ 8-7.650-14 Payments to contractors.

(a) For contracts that do not contain a section entitled "Network Analysis System (NAS), Clause 7, General Provisions, SF 23A," will be implemented as follows:

Payments to Contractors

\* \* \* \* \*  
(f) [Revoked]

(b) For contracts that contain a section entitled "Network Analysis System (NAS), Clause 7, General Provisions, SF 23A," will be implemented as follows

Payments to Contractors

\* \* \* \* \*  
(f) [Revoked]

§ 8-18.202 [Amended]

2. Section 8-18.202 is amended by deleting the reference "§ 8-2.203-1" in the last sentence.

§ 8-18.203-1 [Revoked]

3. Section 8-18.203-1 is revoked.  
(38 U.S.C. 210 (c), 40 U.S.C. 486(c))  
[FR Doc. 79-36783 Filed 11-28-79; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 8328-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Materials Transportation Bureau

49 CFR Part 192

[Docket No. PS-60; Notice 1]

Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline; Hot Taps in Gas Pipelines

AGENCY: Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB).

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This notice proposed to amend § 192.627 to ensure that when pressurized gas pipelines are connected, they have their internal gas pressures positively ascertained by pressure gages prior to the final step of allowing gas to flow between them. This practice is intended to avoid accidents resulting from mistakenly connecting two lines of incompatible pressures.

**DATE:** Comments must be received by March 1, 1980. Late filed comments will be considered as far as practicable.

**ADDRESS:** Comments should identify the docket and notice number and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Branch, Materials Transportation Bureau, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments are available at the Docket Branch, Room 8426. The Docket Branch is open Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Robert F. Langley (202) 426-2082.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in safety recommendation issued August 21, 1978, reported on an accident in Mansfield, Ohio, as follows:

At 2 p.m., e.d.t., on May 17, 1978, a Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., (gas company) construction crew, mistaking an 8-inch, low-pressure steel gas main for an 8-inch, high-pressure steel gas main, drilled a small pilot bit hole through the wall of the low-pressure gas main and began to cut into the pipe wall with a large diameter bit. The construction crew was making a "hot tap" to complete the final tie-in of an 8-inch, replacement gas main to the existing high-pressure system on the north side of Glessner Street in Mansfield, Ohio. The hot tap was to be made using a 3-way tapping tee which had its side outlet welded to the "live," high-pressure replacement gas main and its bottom outlet mistakenly welded to the low-pressure gas main. When the 1-inch pilot bit on the tapping machine attached to the top outlet of the tee penetrated the wall of the low-pressure gas main, gas at 42 psig pressure from the high-pressure gas system entered the 14-inch water column (w.c.) (approximately 1/2 psig the pressure in the low-pressure system in a 4.8-square-mile area of Mansfield.

By 2:20 p.m., after being overpressured for 20 minutes, the low-pressure distribution system returned to its normal pressure of 14 inches w.c. Gas was physically shut off at approximately 2,000 meters or services out of the 12,300 meters in the 4.8-square-mile area. The shutoffs were made by firemen, police, gasmen, emergency response personnel, and residents. There were no fatalities or injuries requiring hospitalization because of this accident. Property damage to 16 houses resulted from the ignition of nearby combustibles by high pilot flames; 5 of these houses were extensively damaged.

On April 28, 1979, the gas company construction crew had abandoned and capped an old main at its connection to

the 8-inch, high-pressure gas main on the north side of Glessner Avenue, on the east side of Arthur Street. At that excavation there were two 8 3/8-inch outside diameter (O.D.), coated, wrapped, and welded steel gas mains, which were identical in appearance. The high-pressure gas main was 3 feet north of and about 10 inches higher than the low-pressure gas main.

Before completing the final tie-in of the new replacement gas main to the existing 8-inch, high-pressure gas main on the west side of Arthur Street, the gas main atlas was consulted to verify the locations of the two gas mains. The atlas showed the 8-inch, high-pressure and low-pressure mains traversing Arthur Street parallel to each other. The small-scale—1 inch to 200 feet—gas main atlas did not indicate the depths of the mains or their locations from the lot line, nor did it show the mains crossing each other. However, investigations after the accident showed that the two mains crossed in the Arthur Street intersection.

In the excavation for the final tie-in west of Arthur Street, approximately 75 feet from the first excavation, the mains appeared to be in the same relative position (3 feet apart), but the north side was 4 inches lower than the south main, which made the tie-in more difficult. The construction crew welded an 8-inch, 3-way tapping tee to the top of the north main, which they presumed was the high-pressure main, and welded the side outlet of the tee to the newly installed high-pressure gas main. Next they pressure-tested the tee and new main successfully and then filled them with gas at 42 psig from the high-pressure system.

The gas company procedure manual acknowledges that it is important to recognize that operating maps may not be correct. The gas company's procedure for "By-Passing and Stopping Gas Flow" recommends that pressure gages be installed to ensure against losing pressure and customer outages. However, the tapping section of the procedure does not contain pressure gage requirements and does not mention the possibility of overpressuring a low-pressure system.

After the accident the first excavation east of Arthur Street was reopened and a pipe locator was connected directly to the high-pressure main. This main was touching another pipe in Arthur Street and could not be traced electronically. The two pipes were excavated where they were touching and were electrically shortcircuited; they were then separated. When traced with the pipe locator again, the high-pressure gas main was found to have crossed the

low-pressure gas main with two 45° elbows in the Arthur Street intersection. The gas company records did not contain field measurements of where these lines crossed and, consequently, the gas main atlases did not show this crossing.

The NSTB report went on to state that the gas company crew was qualified to make hot taps, but it was difficult to identify the correct pipeline because the two pipelines were identical. The NTSB concluded that a pressure gage tap should have been made to determine the exact location of the high pressure main.

Prior to the Mansfield, Ohio, accident, the NTSB investigated and issued safety recommendations (P-77-24 and -25) on a similar accident in Greenwich, Connecticut, on May 25, 1977. In that accident, a gas company crew tapped a 3-inch casing pipe, thinking it was the gas main, and severed the 2-inch gas main inside causing a massive gas escape. The leaking gas entered a building where it exploded and then burned, destroying three buildings, damaging one building, and injuring 10 persons. As in the Mansfield accident, the gas company crew did not positively identify the type, size, and operating pressure of the gas main to be worked on. Safety recommendations P-77-24 and P-77-25 stated that the Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation should: "Instruct its crews to ascertain positively by all possible means the type and size of existing gas line facilities before working on them." (P-77-24), and "Expedite the updating of its gas piping records as soon as possible to eliminate uncertainties on future system maintenance work." (P-77-25).

As a result of these accidents, the NTSB issued safety recommendation P-78-51 to MTB which states: "The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Materials Transportation Bureau of the U.S. Department of Transportation revise 49 CFR 192 to require that gas system operators verify through pressure monitoring or other means the identity of all pipelines before performing hot taps."

A copy of these NTSB safety recommendations has been included in this docket and also may be obtained by writing to Publication Section, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C. 20594.

While the NTSB recommends that 49 CFR Part 192 be changed to include a requirement that, through pressure monitoring, pipelines be identified before hot taps are made on these pipelines, MTB proposes that the pressure monitoring be done through the hot tapping equipment after the hot tap

is made, and prior to allowing gas to flow, since it is quite impossible to check gas pressure in a pipeline at the work location without first making a hot tap.

The problem, as pointed out by these accidents, is the introduction of gas to pipelines at excessive pressures such that they are pressurized beyond their maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) or pressurized in a manner which causes the unsafe operation of any connected and properly adjusted gas utilization equipment. The problem is caused by the failure of personnel making hot taps to properly identify the pipelines involved prior to allowing gas flow between these pipelines.

MTB recognizes that this type of operation requires skill and expertise on the part of the operator's personnel and, therefore, hot tap procedures should only be carried out by personnel trained in the use and application of hot tap equipment as now required by § 192.627. To make this point clear, the phraseology of the existing paragraph of § 192.627 is proposed to be amended.

MTB uses the term "hot tap" as defined in ANSI B31.8 and as commonly used by the pipeline industry: "Hot taps are branch piping connections made to operating pipeline or mains or other facilities while they are in operation. The connection to the branch piping and the operating line and the tapping of the operating line is done while it is under gas pressure."

Since many maps and other records of gas pipeline systems presently in use, particularly those pertaining to old pipeline systems, are not completely reliable, MTB believes that maps and other records should not be used as the only means by which a pipeline is identified. MTB believes that when trained personnel know the actual pressures within the pipelines being tapped or connected, they can react properly and prevent the introduction of gases to a pipeline at incompatible pressures. Most tapping equipment has incorporated fittings which permit a pressure gage to be installed. By using pressure gages on this type of tapping equipment, a reading can be taken of the pressure within the pipeline being tapped when the pipe has been penetrated. Since tapping equipment which incorporates gage tap fittings is readily available, MTB does not feel that amending Part 192 to require this practice would cause undue delays or expense in completing connections made by hot taps. Accordingly, § 192.627 would be amended by adding a new paragraph (b) to require the use of pressure gages to determine the pressure

in each pipeline when pressurized pipelines are connected by hot taps.

Part of NTSB's recommendation to MTB states "or other means" as an alternate to verifying the identity of all pipelines before performing hot taps. With the possible exception of the use of radioactive isotopes introduced into the gas stream, MTB is not aware, at this time, of other means (apart from maps and records) of identifying pipelines in such a manner that they can be safely connected by hot taps and gas be allowed to flow between them. Comments are invited on this issue.

It does not appear that any great hardship would be imposed by this revised rule since most operators have similar safety rules in their operating and maintenance plans. Therefore, MTB has determined that this document does not contain a major proposal requiring preparation of a regulatory analysis under DOT procedures. A draft Evaluation, however, is included in the docket.

In consideration of the foregoing, MTB proposes that Part 192 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations be amended by revising § 192.627 to read as follows:

**§ 192.627 Tapping pipelines under pressure.**

(a) Each tap made on a pipeline under pressure must be performed by a person who has demonstrated competency in the application and use of the tapping equipment.

(b) Where two or more pressurized pipelines are being connected, the pressure in each pipeline being connected must be determined by a pressure gage prior to allowing gas to flow between the pipelines.

(49 U.S.C. 1672; 49 U.S.C. 1804; 49 CFR 1.53 and App. A of Part 1)

Issued in Washington, D.C. on November 20, 1979.

Cesar De Leon,  
*Associate Director for Pipeline Safety  
Regulation, Materials Transportation Bureau.*

[FR Doc. 79-36558 Filed 11-28-79; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-M

**49 CFR Part 192**

[Docket No. PS-61; Notice 1]

**Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline; Maps and Records**

**AGENCY:** Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB).

**ACTION:** Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).

**SUMMARY:** This Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking invites comments

relative to the need to establish regulations which would require gas pipeline operators to have adequate maps and records of their pipeline systems. These maps and records appear necessary to show or describe the operators' gas pipeline systems in sufficient detail to enable portions or components of the pipeline systems to be readily located for construction work, maintenance, or to prevent or alleviate pipeline accidents.

**DATE:** Comments must be filed by March 1, 1980. Late filed comments will be considered as far as practicable.

**ADDRESS:** Comments should identify the docket and notice numbers and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Branch, Materials Transportation Bureau, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments are available at the Docket Branch, Room 8426. The Docket Branch is open Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Robert F. Langley, 202-426-2082.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in recommendation P-78-50 recommended that MTB revise 49 CFR Part 192 to require that gas company system maps and records be maintained accurately to identify the location, size, and operating pressure of all gas pipelines. The NTSB feels that some gas pipeline accidents could be prevented if operators had accurate maps and records of their systems. As a result of its inspection and maintenance program, MTB is aware that there are gas pipeline operators with inadequate maps and records of portions of their gas pipeline systems. The inadequacies include no maps at all, maps which are drawn to such a small scale that they are unreadable, or have inaccurate measurements and other information.

There are many reasons for the inadequate maps, particularly of very old pipeline systems. Among these reasons are fires, floods, or other types of disaster which destroyed the original maps or records. The purpose of any proposed regulations would be to require accurate maps and records of new gas pipeline systems, additions, or changes to existing pipeline systems and the locating and mapping of "lost" or inadequately mapped existing gas pipelines and facilities.

Within the past few years, several accidents involving gas pipelines were due to inadequate or inaccurate maps and records of the pipeline system. For instance, a 1977 accident in Greenwich, Connecticut, which destroyed three buildings and injured 10 people was

caused by inadequate maps and records. The accident was described in NTSB's safety recommendations P-77-24 and 25 as follows:

At 2:34 p.m., on May 25, 1977, an explosion and fire destroyed a building at 65-67 Arch Street in Greenwich, Connecticut. Two adjacent buildings were also destroyed and another building was heavily damaged. Firemen evacuated residents from a two-block area 30 minutes after the explosion. The resulting fire was extinguished at 5:31 p.m. Ten persons required medical treatment for injuries caused by the accident.

Before the accident, a Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation crew was in the area to install an insulating tapping sleeve on a 2-inch gas main. The sleeve is used to electrically isolate a section of pipe without interruption of service, and is commonly used by the industry.

When the gas company crew exposed the gas main, they found that the pipe was 3 inches in diameter instead of 2 inches. The crew leader radioed the dispatch office and requested additional information from its records. The main atlas did not show any detail of the area, however. Even though a 2-inch shutoff valve for the line was 12 feet away, the crew was not aware that the 3-inch pipe they exposed was not the gas main itself but actually was a sleeve containing the 2-inch gas main.

A gas company supervisor went to the site and advised the work crew to use a 3-inch insulating tapping sleeve and to proceed with the task. While cutting through the 3-inch sleeve with a drilling machine, the 2-inch carrier pipe was also cut. This allowed natural gas at 30-psig pressure to fill the annular space between the 3-inch sleeve and the 2-inch pipe and to escape from the unsealed ends of the sleeve, 11 feet away.

The escaping gas was capped by the pavement above and migrated through the soil. It leaked through cracks in the stone foundation of the Arch Street building, 5½ feet from the severed gas main, and entered the basement where it was ignited by some undetermined source and exploded. Two supervisors in the vicinity responded independently to an emergency radio call and began to shut off valves on each side of the leak 16 minutes after the explosion.

NTSB issued safety recommendations P-77-6 through 8 as the result of an accident in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, in 1977. The following summary of the accident shows that lack of good maps or records caused considerable delay in shutting down the gas system:

At 1:36 a.m., e.s.t., on January 25, 1977, a low-order explosion and fire destroyed a house in a residential area near

Williamsport, Pennsylvania; the occupant was not seriously injured by the explosion.

At 1:44 a.m., the fire chief of the Old Lycoming Township Volunteer Fire Department, which had responded to the fire, requested that the Pennsylvania Gas and Water Company (Penn Gas) be notified of the fire and explosion. Because the serviceman assigned to emergency calls lived in a town 20 miles away, and it would have taken him 45 minutes to reach the scene of the accident because of heavy snow, a local serviceman was dispatched from Williamsport at 1:55 a.m. At 2:01 a.m., firemen again notified the gas company of strong odors of gas at the accident site.

The local serviceman arrived at 2:10 a.m. in his personal vehicle without the necessary tools and equipment to deal effectively with the gas emergency. He determined that, since there was no gas service into the house that exploded, the gas main was leaking. He telephoned his dispatcher for a street crew at 2:15 a.m.; he also drove to the gas company shop for a combustible gas indicator (CGI) and other work tools.

At 2:39 a.m., a few minutes after the street crew arrived, another explosion demolished a large house 100 feet away. A resident of the house and a bystander were killed by the explosion; several persons, including 19 firemen, were injured. Automobiles, a firetruck, and many houses within a one-block radius were damaged severely.

The first street crew was alerted and arrived too late to do anything in the 4 minutes remaining before the second house exploded. One of the crews that arrived 1½-hours later searched in vain for a high-pressure shutoff valve that was shown on the gas main drawings to be one block away. The gas pressure was finally controlled enough for a repair to be made 9½ hours later. However, the gas could not be shut off without terminating service to many customers. Although it would not have mattered in this accident because the second house exploded before the street crews could act, a delay caused by searching for nonexistent shutoff valves during an emergency could be disastrous.

One of the NTSB's recommendations (P-77-40) to Pennsylvania Gas and Water because of this accident stated: "Verify the location of all high-pressure shutoff valves shown on gas main atlases and change maps where necessary."

The following accidents reported by NTSB in special reports P-75-004 and FTW-77-FP-001 also indicate lack of records:

In 1975 in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, a leaking gas service, which, because of inaccurate records, was incorrectly thought to have been cut off from the source of supply, resulted in a fatality and a destroyed residence.

In 1977, failure to have adequate maps and records caused the overpressuring of a low pressure system in El Paso, Texas. The resulting fires caused \$15,000 damage.

These accidents highlight the fact that sometimes even large operators with competent staffs have system maps and accompanying records that are insufficient or inadequate to indicate with accuracy the location of underground gas facilities in order to prevent damage to these facilities and thus prevent loss of life, injuries, and loss of property. In addition to accident prevention, maps and records are also important to assure compliance with many of the operating and maintenance requirements of Part 192.

#### Objective

This advance notice is not a proposal to amend the existing regulations. Its intent is to generate information to be used in evaluating means for improving pipeline safety. If the evaluation leads to the conclusion that the regulations should be amended, MTB will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) stating the proposed amendments and inviting comment on those proposals.

#### Means

Most pipeline operators now have methods of transposing work done in the field into accurate descriptions of the actual installed system through maps and other types of records. However, MTB is concerned that there are also many operators who continue to rely on poor maps or records. Therefore, regulatory action may be needed to assure that adequate maps and records are kept.

By this notice, MTB invites early participation by interested persons in determining the type of information that should be on maps and records for them to be considered adequate.

How are maps and records currently kept for new and existing pipelines? What information should be required on a map of new facilities versus maps of existing facilities? Should pipeline safety standards prescribe the scale or media for these maps or records or should each operator choose a system or method best suited to his needs? Should the location of pipelines and other facilities be shown merely by scale or should detailed dimensions be used with tie-in points to known bounds and property lines?

In addition to the location of the pipeline, should its size and material be included on the map or record? Since grades can change due to erosion and construction, would it be practical to show the depth below grade of the pipeline and other buried pipeline facilities?

Should the location of all valves be shown on maps? If so, would it be appropriate to include such a requirement in § 192.179, Transmission line valves, and § 192.181, Distribution line valves?

Should regulator stations and vaults be shown in detail or by schematic symbol only, and MTB would like to know if such an item should be included in § 192.185.

If gas service lines were to be included on maps and in individual records, should all service lines be shown or only those service lines 2 inches and larger and should this requirement be included in §§ 192.361 and 192.365?

Would it be practical to place all the requirements for maps and records within an existing regulation such as § 192.605, Essentials of operating and maintenance; into an entirely new regulation specifically addressed to maps and records similar to the manner in which it is done in § 192.491, Corrosion control records; or would it be more practical to insert individual requirements into specific regulations?

Would there be any need to require that the maximum allowable operating pressures (MAOP) be shown on maps? This might be done by area or district.

Would it be practical to include on maps or only on written records the date of installation, the manufacturer of the material (to include pipe and appurtenances), and the method of construction i.e. welded, threaded and coupled, compression coupled, and bolted flange or collar types of construction?

In producing pipeline maps or other records, should consideration be given to noting climatic conditions (in general for the area or in evidence at the time of installation), geological and seismic conditions, and general soil conditions at the time and place of the installation? The latter to be in addition to any records of soil conditions produced to aid compliance with Subpart I 49 CFR Part 192.

Also, in addition to the previously mentioned "class location", would it be practical to require records of existing and projected population and demographic characteristics associated with the area?

If class location were shown on individual maps, would this be a help in

upgrading the pipelines to conform to requirements of § 192.611?

Would showing abandoned gas pipelines and facilities, in particular those that have been put to other uses, such as for casings or sleeves, be a useful requirement?

MTB would appreciate answers or comments on these questions. In addition, cost data of implementing the suggested regulations, particularly for existing pipelines, should be included with the comments.

No Regulatory Analysis is presented, as yet; however, a draft Evaluation is included in the public docket.

(49 CFR U.S.C. 1672; 49 CFR Part 1.53(a), Appendix A of Part 1 and Paragraph (b)(2) of Appendix A to Part 106.)

Issued in Washington, D.C., on November 20, 1979.

Cesar De Leon,

*Associate Director for Pipeline Safety Regulation, Materials Transportation Bureau.*

[FR Doc. 79-36654 Filed 11-28-79; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-M

## Coast Guard

49 CFR Parts 450, 451, 452 and 453

(CGD 79-027)

## Safety Approval of Cargo Containers

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

**SUMMARY:** The U.S. Coast Guard proposes to amend its Safety Approval of Cargo Container regulations to incorporate public comments and international discussions. Among several other changes, this document proposes to: (1) allow persons or organizations to whom an approval authority is delegated in any contracting state to obtain a delegation as an approval authority for the United States on a reciprocal basis, (2) expand and standardize the information required to be submitted by an owner or manufacturer to an approval authority, and (3) add alternative approval of new containers by design type.

**DATES:** Comments must be received on or before December 31, 1979.

**ADDRESS:** Comments should be submitted to: Commandant (G-CMC/TP24) (CGD 79-027), U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C. 20593.

Comments will be available for examination at the Marine Safety Council (G-CMC/TP24), Room 2418, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, D.C.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. Charles H. Hochman, Cargo and

Hazardous Materials Division (G-MHM-2/TP14), Room 1406, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20593, 202-426-1577.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On April 20, 1978, the U.S. Coast Guard published a Final Rule, Safety Approval of Cargo Containers, Docket CGD 73-286 (43 FR 16946), which established the domestic administrative machinery for the approval of containers which are subject to the requirements of the International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC), 1972. The background and basis for the regulations was discussed in that rulemaking. U.S. owned containers are subject to the requirements of the CSC when they enter the jurisdiction of contracting parties. The CSC came into force on September 6, 1977, for the first ten contracting parties and on January 3, 1979, for the United States. Interested persons were invited to give their views prior to the closing date, November 22, 1978.

## Drafting Information

The principal drafters of this document are Charles H. Hochman, Project Manager, Office of Merchant Marine Safety and Michael N. Mervin, Project counsel, Office of Chief Counsel.

## Discussion of Major Comments

In addition to the comments received from the public, discussions at the 19th and 20th sessions of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Containers and Cargoes Subcommittee and the 21st session of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport (GRCT) have attempted to develop harmonized interpretation and implementation procedures among all the contracting parties to the CSC. It is anticipated that these harmonized interpretation and implementation procedures will be used by all future contracting states when they develop their national regulations.

A change initiated by the Coast Guard involves section § 450.11, Application for delegation of authority, dealing with the delegation to persons or organizations as approval authorities. Both IMCO and GRCT have stated in their harmonized interpretation and implementation procedures that approval of containers would be facilitated if classification societies or other organizations approved by one contracting party could be authorized to act for other contracting parties under arrangements acceptable to the parties involved. To incorporate this change, which was supported by the U.S.