



# National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D C 20594

Office of the Chairman

MAY 18 2005

Ms. Stacey L. Gerard  
Acting Chief Safety Officer  
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials  
Safety Administration  
Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Gerard:

Thank you for your February 4, 2005, letter responding to Safety Recommendations P-04-7 and -8, stated below. These recommendations were issued to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) on November 4, 2004, as a result of the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the April 7, 2003, petroleum storage tank explosion and fire at the ConocoPhillips tank farm near Glenpool, Oklahoma.

#### P-04-7

Revise the emergency response planning requirements in the pipeline safety regulations to include coordination with electric and other utilities that may need to respond to a pipeline emergency.

The Safety Board notes that PHMSA established an action plan to change the emergency response planning requirements in the pipeline safety regulations to include coordination with electric and other utilities that may need to respond to a pipeline emergency. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-04-7 is classified "Open—Acceptable Response," pending completion of this regulatory change.

#### P-04-8

Issue an advisory bulletin to liquid pipeline operators to validate the accuracy of their tank strapping tables.

Because PHMSA issued an advisory bulletin on April 6, 2005, to liquid pipeline operators to validate the accuracy of their tank strapping tables as requested, Safety Recommendation P-04-8 is classified "Closed—Acceptable Action."

Thank you for your prompt action and commitment to pipeline safety. The Safety Board looks forward to receiving further information on action taken to implement Safety Recommendation P-04-7.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark V. Rosenker".

Mark V. Rosenker  
Acting Chairman

cc: Ms. Linda Lawson, Director  
Office of Safety, Energy, and Environment  
Office of Transportation Policy

204-8

P-04-788

[FR Doc 05-6803 Filed 4-5-05; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 4910-60-M

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Pipeline and Hazardous Materials  
Safety Administration**

**Pipeline Safety: Strapping Table  
Calibration for Pipeline Breakout Tank  
Operators**

**AGENCY:** Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),  
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety  
Administration (PHMSA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice; issuance of advisory  
bulletin.

**SUMMARY:** This advisory notice alerts  
pipeline operators of all hazardous  
liquid pipeline facility systems about  
the need to validate the accuracy of  
breakout tank strapping tables. Under  
certain circumstances, strapping table  
errors can potentially lead to dangerous  
conditions.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Joy  
Kadnar by phone at (202) 366-0568, by  
fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail,  
[joy.kadnar@dot.gov](mailto:joy.kadnar@dot.gov). General  
information about the Pipeline and  
Hazardous Materials Safety  
Administration's Office of Pipeline  
Safety (OPS) programs may be obtained  
by accessing the home page at [http://  
ops.dot.gov](http://ops.dot.gov)

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**I. Background**

A breakout tank exploded and  
subsequently ignited in Glenpool,  
Oklahoma on April 7, 2003. The  
accident involved an 80,000-barrel  
breakout tank that exploded and burned  
as it was being filled with diesel. The  
resulting fire burned for over 20 hours  
and damaged two other nearby breakout  
tanks. While there were no injuries or  
fatalities, the cost of the accident  
exceeded two million dollars, residents  
adjacent to the accident site were  
evacuated, and area schools were closed  
for two days.

The National Transportation Safety  
Board (NTSB) conducted an  
investigation into the accident and  
subsequently published a Pipeline  
Accident Report titled "Storage Tank  
Explosion and Fire in Glenpool,  
Oklahoma." In its findings adopted on  
October 13, 2004, the NTSB issued a  
recommendation to OPS to issue an  
advisory bulletin to liquid pipeline  
operators to validate the accuracy of  
their tank strapping tables.

The breakout tank that exploded  
contained an internal floating roof  
system equipped with pontoons that

float on top of the product at a certain  
level. The tank also had legs that  
supported the roof whenever the  
product was drained and the volume of  
liquid in the tank decreased to the level  
at which the roof no longer floated.  
Additionally, the tank had two  
Supervisory Control and Data  
Acquisition System (SCADA) alarms to  
alert controllers when the volume was  
nearing the level at which the roof  
would no longer float. The alarm set  
points were based on the landed height  
of the floating roof assumed in the  
operator's strapping table.

NTSB determined that based on the  
height measurement of the floating roof  
documented on the construction  
inspection report, and based on  
measurements investigators made after  
the accident, the strapping table was  
incorrect. Specifically, the distance from  
the bottom of the pontoon to the datum  
plate was found to be higher than  
indicated on the pre-accident strapping  
table. The surface of the charged diesel  
was within approximately two inches of  
the pontoons at the time of the  
explosion. This, according to NTSB, is  
the most likely time for a static  
discharge to occur. Based on this  
finding, as well as other contributing  
factors, the NTSB determined that an  
incorrect measurement on the strapping  
table contributed to the cause(s) of the  
accident.

**II. Advisory Bulletin ADB-05-02**

*To:* Owners and Operators of All  
Pipeline Facilities Who Rely on  
Strapping Tables to Determine Volume  
Based on Measured Height For Product  
Level.

*Subject:* Validation of Strapping  
Tables to Reduce the Likelihood of  
Errors That May Lead to Dangerous  
Conditions in Breakout Tanks

*Purpose:* To advise owners and  
operators of all hazardous liquid  
pipeline facilities about the need to  
validate strapping tables.

*Advisory:* Strapping Tables are  
commonly used to determine the  
commodity volume based on product  
level within breakout tanks. If the  
strapping table is incorrect, operators  
may expose themselves and the  
community to unnecessary risks.

OPS seeks to advise operators that  
they should review and, if necessary,  
revise their breakout tank operating  
procedures to minimize risk. The  
strapping tables should be validated to  
reduce the potential for errors that may  
lead to dangerous conditions, such as  
static discharge inside a tank after a  
floating roof has been either  
intentionally or unintentionally landed.  
Pipeline operators, therefore, may need

to adjust the measurements on their  
strapping tables to ensure accuracy.

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 18,  
2005

**Theodore L. Willke,**

*Deputy Associate Administrator for Pipeline  
Safety*

[FR Doc 05-6729 Filed 4-5-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Pipeline and Hazardous Materials  
Safety Administration**

[Docket No. RSPA-04-19914; Notice 1]

**Pipeline Safety: Petition for Waiver;  
Enstar Natural Gas Company**

**AGENCY:** Pipeline and Hazardous  
Materials Safety Administration  
(PHMSA), U.S. Department of  
Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice; Petition for Waiver.

**SUMMARY:** Enstar Natural Gas Company  
(Enstar) has petitioned the Office of  
Pipeline Safety (OPS) for a waiver of the  
pipeline safety regulation that prohibits  
tracer wire from being wrapped around  
the pipe.

**DATES:** Persons interested in submitting  
written comments on the waiver request  
described in this Notice must do so by  
May 6, 2005. Late filed comments will  
be considered so far as practicable.

**ADDRESSES:** You may submit written  
comments by mailing or delivering an  
original and two copies to the Dockets  
Facility, U.S. Department of  
Transportation, Room PL-401, 400  
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC  
20590-0001. The Dockets Facility is  
open from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday  
through Friday, except on Federal  
holidays when the facility is closed.  
Alternatively, you may submit written  
comments to the docket electronically at  
the following Web address: [http://  
dms.dot.gov](http://dms.dot.gov).

All written comments should identify  
the docket and notice numbers stated in  
the heading of this notice. Anyone who  
wants confirmation of mailed comments  
must include a self-addressed stamped  
postcard. To file written comments  
electronically, after logging on to  
<http://dms.dot.gov>, click on "Comment/  
Submissions." You can also read  
comments and other material in the  
docket. General information about the  
Federal pipeline safety program is  
available at <http://ops.dot.gov>.

Anyone is able to search the  
electronic form of all comments  
received into any of our dockets by the  
name of the individual submitting the